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Calculus of Consent: The Calculus of Consent v. 2 (Tullock, Gordon. Selections. V. 2.) | 
enlarge | Authors: James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Charles Kershaw Rowle Publisher: Liberty Fund Inc.,U.S. Category: Book
List Price: £13.95 Buy New: £9.20 You Save: £4.75 (34%)
Rating: 3 reviews Sales Rank: 1358128
Media: Hardcover Pages: 364 Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.5 Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.1
ISBN: 0865975213 Dewey Decimal Number: 321.8 EAN: 9780865975217 ASIN: 0865975213
Publication Date: November 1, 2004 Shipping: Eligible for Super Saver Shipping Availability: Usually dispatched within 24 hours
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Strong Quality of Thought, Conservative Bias Hard to Swallow November 3, 1998 4 out of 5 found this review helpful
The Calculus of consent attempts to answer two questions through the locus of an economic decision model; what should be a public decision, and how are these decisions made. The authors answer these questions with a simple but surprisingly powerful model. They discuss all possible actions in terms of costs. Only actions whose costs are minimized through collective provision should be considered to be handled in the public sector. Once a service is determined to be 'cost-minimized' through collective provision, decision rules must be established to determine what proportion of individuals need to agree in order to take public action. These decision rules are based on two types of costs, external costs - or the costs others could impose on an individual's liberty and property if group action is taken, and decision costs - the costs of putting together a decision making coalition. The closer to unanimous approval the lower the risks of high external costs, but the less number of people needed to make a decision, the lower the decision costs. Buchanan and Tullock argue that the proportion of the population's approval needed to make a public decision is at the number of people where the combined decision and external costs are minimized.This model in itself is robust, however in application, it is clear that Buchanan and Tullock would prefer to error on the side of minimizing what they call threats to 'liberty and property'. Therefore, they forward a strongly conservative agenda in which a small propertied minority can, in this axiom legitimately, block the collectivization of activities which a majority of the population supports.
A genuine, celebrated classic February 13, 1999 4 out of 5 found this review helpful
Some reviewers comment that this book has "a conservative bias." Nothing could be further from the truth. This book is written in the great classical-liberal tradition that motivated the American revolution and the drafting of America's 1787 Constitution. Buchanan and Tullock saw themselves as putting into modern economic language the insights and wisdom of James Madison and Co. The book does indeed counsel skepticism of big government, and it is no great fan of unlimited democracy. But the authors come to this position because they understand that even democratic governments can be tyrannical and that a depoliticized society -- governed largely by private property rights -- promises peace, prosperity, and cultural flourishing. Few books on economics are as original and insightful as is The Calculus of Consent -- and it remains as fresh in 1999 as it was when first published in 1962.
Foundation of conservative ideology,but is that a good thing November 3, 1998 4 out of 11 found this review helpful
The authors claim to be 'scientific', 'rational', 'empirical', 'economic' in their assessment of the public decision making process and the role of public choice, but there are clearly several normative value judgements embedded in their framework. In discussing their choice of optimal rules, the authors state that an assumption of their model is that all votes are considered equal, and that if this assumption is not valid then there model will fail to function properly. They continue in stating that this is not a very large constraint as one vote is only one vote whether or not the individual uses it or cares about it or not. However, a hundred pages later, the author's apply their model to representational democracy, an area where a very compelling argument can be made that all votes are not equal, yet they fail to address this fairly basic flaw in their thinking, or how it effects the functioning of their model. The authors also repeatedly give the same importance to the protection of property that they do to the protection of liberty, another normative assumption that influences their model, as they seem to egg the reader on in thinking that greater decision costs can be tolerated if the stake is Liberty and property. This piggy-backing of the property rights of the wealthy on the civil rights of the working class seems pretty disingenuous as the end result of this piggy-backing is that the workers get screwed while the rich are free to get richer. However the weakest aspect of the text from an 'empirical' perspective, is that the authors leave their definition of costs largely undefined. In other words they can, and indeed do, shift the 'contract locus' at will to ensure that a conservative ideology will prevail no matter the given situation. That the authors oppose the enlargement of government is clear, as is the fact they justify this position by advocating what they call personal liberty, which is in reality the protection of the private property of the few. Those may or may not be convincing arguments depending on the readers own perspective (and pocketbook). However, the authors do not claim to be offering a perspective. They are offering a 'calculus of consent', a scientific method by which to divine our political choices free of the nasty constraints of opinion and values. Put it this way, as passionate intellectual forefathers of slippery right wing rationalizations for greed and inequality, these authors score major points, as dispassionate scientists merely describing the way 'things are' they are merely majorly hilarious.
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